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Filling the
Protection Gaps for
Climate Change and
Disaster-Induced
Migrants
by Kimberly A. Erickson*

Introduction
The number of global migrants is simultaneously increasing along with the severity of the climate
crise worldwide. Currently, neither international nor
regional law addresses the environmental drivers of
migration, and there are severe gaps in legal protections for this type of migrants. While the global focus
is now shifting towards the drivers for climate and
disaster-induced migration with recent collaborative
efforts amongst the majority of states and UN initiatives, states must fill the gaps in legal protections for
climate and disaster-induced migrants through comprehensive global cooperation and state action.
One potential solution to provide climate migrants
with legal protection is redefining the term “refugee”
so that climate migrants who cross state borders can
qualify for refugee status and international assistance.
However, a legal redefinition is unlikely to help most
environmentally displaced persons because (1) many
will remain internally displaced and unable to access
international protection, (2) climate change often has
slow-onset effects that do not necessarily force migration, and (3) multiple grounds for refugee status
would be difficult to isolate from one another, complicating the status determination process.
Instead of a redefinition, states should implement
proactive measures to develop other protected paths
of migration. Such measures may include disaster
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prevention and preparedness, adaptation to natural
hazards, and planned relocation options for environmentally vulnerable populations. Disaster preparation
and response plans, sustainable adaptation efforts,
and strategic relocation are more easily tailored to
individual communities and their respective environmental threats than one universal refugee status that
only offers post-crisis protection for external displacements. States can protect climate and disaster-induced migrants by taking steps like these to close the
gap between humanitarian and development action.
I. Environmental Drivers of Migration
A climate-induced migrant generally refers to a
person that is driven from their home by sudden or
gradual changes in the weather or climate.1 Rapid
onset events are singular, discrete weather events that
occur within a matter of days or even hours.2 Such
events may include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes,
landslides, severe storms, tornadoes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and wildfires. Slow-onset events evolve
over years from incremental changes or increased
frequency or intensity of recurring events.3 Examples
include desertification, salinization, temperature
increase, land infertility, and rising sea levels.4 Migration may be either temporary or permanent and may
be caused by seasonal conditions or a singular incident.5 This type of human mobility may be voluntary,
* Kimberly A. Erickson, née Nedza, received her J.D. from Syracuse University College of Law (’22) and MPA from Syracuse
University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
(’22). She was the Lead Articles Editor for Volume 12 of the Journal of Global Rights and Organizations. She would like to thank
the Human Rights Brief editorial team for their hard work and
assistance.
1
See Emily Wilkinson et al., Climate-Induced Migration
and Displacement: Closing the Policy Gap, Overseas
Dev. Inst. 2 (Oct. 2016), https://odi.org/en/publications/
climate-induced-migration-and-displacement-closing-the-policy-gap/ (For the Report, go to “Climate-induced migration
and displacement: closing the policy gap” and click “DOWNLOAD PDF”).
2
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Slow Onset
Events: Technical Paper, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2012/7
(Nov. 26, 2012).
3
Id.
4
Id. ¶¶ 26–49.
5
Wilkinson et al., supra note 1, at 1.
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but it is often considered a forced movement in order
to survive.6
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their homes, which often causes an additional and
immense amount of suffering.11 Displacement may
compound already existing vulnerabilities and cause
additional conflict because of competition over space
and resources in new locations.12 This undermines
social unity and community resilience, while also
creating new risks such as overpopulation and environmental degradation in the places where displaced
persons are taking refuge.13

Climate change is causing human suffering in many
ways. Natural resources such as potable water and
materials for shelter are becoming scarcer in certain
areas.7 Crops and livestock are not able to withstand
deteriorating conditions, such as extreme temperatures and precipitation patterns.8 Rising sea levels
are pushing coastal communities further inland and
sometimes completely out of their submerging homelands.9 Declining conditions are rendering survival
difficult and economic stability near impossible to
maintain.10 These extreme circumstances can become
unbearable for individuals, forcing people to leave

Climate change continues to cause slow-onset transformations that increase the frequency and severity of
natural disasters,14 thus sustaining aggressive growth
of disaster and climate-induced migration. In 2018,
there were 17.2 million new internal displacements

See id. at 3; see also Régis Blanc, Migration and Forced
Displacement: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, Helvetas (Dec.
9, 2021), https://www.helvetas.org/en/switzerland/how-youcan-help/follow-us/blog/Other/Migration-and-Forced-Displacement-Two-Sides-of-the-Same-Coin (explaining that the
voluntary characterization of migration is debatable since the
traditional distinction of displacement is rooted more in the
context of war rather than environmental influences).
7
Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land
and Natural Resources Conflict, United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action 17 (2012),
https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/
GN_Renew.pdf.
8
Climate Impacts on Agriculture and Food Supply, U.S. Env’t
Prot. Agency, https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-impacts/climate-impacts-agriculture-and-food-supply_.
html (last modified Jan. 19, 2017).
9
See Nithin Coca, Balancing Climate, Culture, and Community: Fiji’s Relocation Challenge, Devex (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://devex.shorthandstories.com/balancing-climate-culture-and-community-fijis-relocation-challenge/index.html
(providing an example of relocating inland due to rising
sea levels in the Fijian village of Korolevu); see Kiribati, the
First Country Rising Sea Levels Will Swallow up as a Result of
Climate Change, Iberdrola, https://www.iberdrola.com/sustainability/kiribati-climate-change (last visited May 16, 2022)
(providing an example of relocating inland and initating
emigration due to rising sea levels around the Pacific islands
of Kiribati).
10
See Press Release, Climate Change ‘Biggest Threat Modern Humans Have Ever Faced’, World-Renowned Naturalist
Tells Security Council, Calls for Greater Global Cooperation,
U.N. Press Release SC/14445 (Feb. 23, 2021) (referring to
threatened access to freshwater, food security, and habitable
temperatures along with the destruction of infrastructure and
reduced crop harvests).

Exploitation and Abuse of International Migrants,
Particularly Those in an Irregular Situation: A Human Rights Approach, Glob. Migration Grp. 29 (Dec.
2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2013/2013_GMG_Thematic_Paper.pdf (noting that
besides facing the loss of one’s homeland and difficulty finding
legal avenues for permanent residence in a new nation, migrants are often vulnerable to economic hardship, xenophobia, and exploitation).
12
Climate Change and Disaster Displacemen: How to
Reduce Risk, Address Impacts and Strengthen Resilience, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees 5 (2019), https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-disasters.html.
13
U.N. Off. for Disaster Risk Reduction, Words Into
Actions: Disaster Displacement: How to Reduce Risk,
Address Impacts and Strengthen Resilience 5 (2017),
https://www.preventionweb.net/files/58821_wiadisasterdisplacement190511webeng.pdf.
14
Shannon Heyck-Williams, Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Wildlife: Climate Change Is Worsening Some Types
of Natural Disasters, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n 1 (Nov. 2019),
https://www.nwf.org/-/media/Documents/PDFs/Environmental-Threats/Climate-Change-Natural-Disasters-fact-sheet.
ashx.

6
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associated with natural disasters,15 and in 2019, there
were an additional 24.9 million.16 New internal disaster-induced displacements amounted to nearly triple
the number of internal displacements caused by conflict and violence in 2019.17 These numbers are likely
an underestimate and only reflect displacements that
were forced, internal, and results of sudden-onset
disasters.18 Not reflected in the data is the number of
migrants who moved across state borders, those who
migrated due to slow-onset climate change, and those
who were displaced but are unaccounted for by states
or organizations.
The World Bank has estimated that if no reductive
action is taken, there will be 143 million internal
climate migrants by 2050 within the regions of Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.19
Although the international community has acknowledged that climate migrants make up a large portion
of the world’s forcibly displaced population and that
the population is expected to grow continuously and
rapidly,20 no international response has been agreed
upon or implemented. While a majority of these cli-
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mate migrants are expected to move internally, there
will be displaced persons forced out of their countries
of origin as well.21 However, it is not one or the other
that requires attention but rather the combination of
both internal and external displacements that warrants an international response. The World Bank
estimates that, with mitigating measures, the world
can reduce climate-induced migration by up to eighty
percent.22 Therefore, an organized effort to reduce
negative human contributions to climate change, improve the resiliency of vulnerable communities, and
develop effective response plans is necessary for states
to address the climate migration crisis.
II. Qualifications for Refugee Status

In international law, there is no formal definition for
a climate migrant nor recognition of climate migrants
as refugees, which limits their eligibility for international protection.23 The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and
the corresponding 1967 UN Protocol (1967 Protocol)
amendment define a refugee as any person who is
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
15
Vicente Anzellini et al., Internal Displacement Monfor reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
itoring Ctr., Global Report on Internal Displacement
24
2019 6–7 (May 2019), https://www.internal-displacement.org/ of a particular social group, or political opinion.
global-report/grid2019/ (To download the report, scroll to the To qualify as a refugee, a person must show fear of
bottom of the page, and click “Download full report”) [hereindividualized persecution, not merely generalized

inafter Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019].
Vicente Anzellini et al., Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., Global Report on Internal Displacement
2020, 9–10 (Apr. 2020), https://www.internal-displacement.
org/global-report/grid2020/ (To download the report, scroll
to the bottom of the page, and click “Download full report”)
[hereinafter Global Report on Internal Displacement
2020].
17
Id. at 1.
18
Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019, supra
note 15, at 6–7; Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, supra note 16, at 9–10.
19
Kanta Kumari Rigaud et al., Groundswell: Preparing
for Internal Climate Migration, World Bank xix (Mar.
2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2018/03/19/groundswell---preparing-for-internal-climate-migration.
20
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, UNHCR & Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, Off. of the
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 5 (2017), https://www.
unhcr.org/596f25467.pdf.
16

Walter Kälin, Displacement Caused by the Effects of Climate
Change: Who Will Be Affected and What Are the Gaps in the
Normative Framework for Their Protection?, Brookings Inst.
§ II (Oct. 10, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/research/displacement-caused-by-the-effects-of-climate-change-who-willbe-affected-and-what-are-the-gaps-in-the-normative-framework-for-their-protection/.
22
Kumari Rigaud et al., supra note 19, at xxv.
23
Erol Yayboke et al., A New Framework for U.S. Leadership
on Climate Migration, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. 7
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-framework-us-leadership-climate-migration.
24
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 art. 1, § (A)(2); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267, art. 1, § (A)(2).
21
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violence, and must be displaced outside of their coun- stances that seriously disturb public order and compel
try of origin.25
a person to flee their home to seek refuge in another
state as a basis for refugee status.30 These treaties do
Fear of persecution and displacement outside the
not specifically address climate change or natural
country of origin may or may not apply to climate
disasters, but the language creates a possibility that
migrants. Environmentally displaced persons may
such conditions could be considered when evaluating
experience a fear of persecution in addition to clian externally displaced person’s eligibility for refugee
mate or disaster-related issues because there are
status. However, regional laws that grant refugee staoften several overlapping or intertwining reasons
tus to certain displaced persons are not always bind26
for displacement. Attempting to classify a person
ing and protections afforded to refugees are limited to
as a refugee based on one type of persecution can be
particular regions.
difficult for organizations and agencies tasked with
III. Broadening the Definition of “Refugee”
addressing displacement crises, and even impossible
if the person is internally displaced rather than having to Encompass Environmental Drivers of Mibeen forced outside of their nation’s borders.27 The in- gration
ability of a climate migrant to obtain a refugee status
One possible avenue to increase international promay lead to a significant deprivation of international
28
tection of climate-displaced persons is to officially
protection.
enumerate climate change and natural disasters as acceptable grounds for refugee status. There are numerIn some circumstances, regional law may permit a
ous arguments for and against the formal redefinition
disaster-displaced person to obtain refugee status.
of “refugee” as stated in the 1951 Convention and
This is usually a result of other threats such as viothe 1967 Protocol,31 many of which apply to regional
lence and persecution that have become exacerbated
redefinition as well.32 While broadening the definition
by a natural disaster and which a person may use as
evidence to qualify as a refugee.29 Some regional laws, of “refugee” by amending these UN conventions may
such as the Organisation of African Unity Convention be a progressive step, there are valid arguments that
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
it is not a realistic measure, nor will it substantially
in Africa (OAU Convention) and the Declaración de
address the expansion of aid for climate and disasCartagena Sobre los Refugiados (Cartagena Declater-induced migrants.
ration) in Latin America, include events or circumOne advantage of amending the currently recognized
definitions is to update treaties that are too outdated
25
Asylum & the Rights of Refugees: Who Is a Refugee?, Int’l
Just. Res. Ctr., https://ijrcenter.org/refugee-law/#Who_Is_a_ to appropriately respond to modern challenges, such
as climate change,33 while still retaining established
Refugee (last visited May 1, 2022).
See Sanjula Weerasinghe, In Harm’s Way: International Protection in the Context of Nexus Dynamics
Between Conflict or Violence & Disaster or Climate
Change, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees 9 (Dec. 2018),
https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=5c4987324.
27
Dina Ionesco, Let’s Talk About Climate Migrants, Not Climate Refugees, UN Sustainable Dev. Goals (June 6, 2019),
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/06/
lets-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees/.
28
See Dignity in Movement: Borders, Bodies and Rights
(Jasmin Lilian Diab ed., 2021).
29
The Nansen Initiative: Agenda for the Protection
of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of
Disasters and Climate Change ¶ 55 (2015).
26

E.g., Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Organization of African Unity, Sept.
10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, art. 1, ¶ 2; Cartagena Declaration
on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of
Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama art. 3, ¶ 3,
Nov. 22, 1984.
31
Dignity in Movement, supra note 28, at 42–44.
32
Id. at 44–45.
33
See Adrienne Millbank, The Problem with the 1951 Refugee
Convention, Parliament of Austl. (Sept. 5, 2000), https://
www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_library/pubs/rp/rp0001/01rp05#:~:text=The%20crux%20of%20criticism%20is,refugees%20in%20
their%20own%20countries).
30
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exclusion clauses that prevent suspected criminals
from taking advantage of refugee status.34 The UN
adopted the 1951 Convention for the purpose of solving migration issues that arose during the post-World
War II era.35 Rather than creating novel contemporary problems, acknowledging climate change and its
consequences generates awareness of its longstanding
effects on vulnerable populations. With international
or regional validation as drivers of migration, states
can address climate change and natural disasters
more directly by specifying protective provisions for
forcibly displaced migrants that fall under this category of refugee.
Broadening the definition of “refugee” could make
international assistance more accessible for displaced
persons presently ineligible for refugee status. However, allowing millions more displaced persons to access
refugee channels would likely overwhelm destination
states and exhaust their resources.36 Some advocates
even believe the guidelines set forth in the 1951 Convention and other regional treaties were too broad to
begin with and should be narrowed because the

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note
24, art. 1, § (F); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
supra note 24, art. 1, § (F); Jane McAdam, Seven Reasons the
UN Refugee Convention Should Not Include ‘Climate Refugees’,
Sydney Morning Herald (June 6, 2017, 11:33 AM), https://
www.smh.com.au/opinion/seven-reasons-the-un-refugeeconvention-should-not-include-climate-refugees-20170606gwl8b4.html.
35
A ‘Timeless’ Treaty Under Attack, U.N. High Comm’r for
Refugees (June 1, 2001), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/
stories/2001/6/3b4c067ac/a-timeless-treaty-under-attack.
html.
36
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note
24, art. 33; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 24, art. 33; Spyridoula Katsoni, The Future of “Climate
Refugees” in International Law, Völkerrechtsblog (May
6, 2021), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-future-of-climate-refugees-in-international-law/ (referencing the principle of non-refoulement that prohibits a state from returning
any refugee to a territory where his life or freedom would be
threatened).
34
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world already cannot manage the needs of so many
refugees.37 However, turning a blind eye to displaced
persons merely ignores a problem that will not go
away, whether those persons are classified as refugees
or otherwise.38
There are other reasons for rejecting the redefinition
of “refugee” in the 1951 Convention. The UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) argues that
the 1951 Convention is the only universal refugee
instrument that is still relevant today, filling its role
as a united front that offers refuge to persons fleeing
persecution.39 But perhaps, instead of trying to fit
climate-induced migrants into the same mold, more
beneficial solutions could be derived from more specifically tailored agreements. Climate-induced migrants will also not be able to reap the benefit of being
put into this definition because they are most often
internally displaced, thus disqualifying them from
protection.40 The 1951 Convention would not be able
to offer international protection to displaced persons
as long as they remain within their own country (or
even if a migrant crossed into a non-signatory state).
That obligation would fall squarely on the countries
of origin.41 Many internally displaced persons (IDPs)
may not be interested in crossing state borders to
seek international aid, instead preferring to remain as
close to home as possible due to family or community
ties and endeavoring to obtain assistance from their
respective states.42 Financial barriers may also prevent
IDPs from traveling across national borders to seek
Has the Refugee Convention Outlived Its Usefulness?, New
Humanitarian (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2012/03/26/has-refugee-convention-outlived-its-usefulness (arguing that non-refoulement and status
determination procedures are time-consuming, costly, and
can be abused by migrants seeking to avoid immigration
controls).
38
Kumari Rigaud et al., supra note 19, at xiv.
39
Millbank, supra note 33, at 18.
40
Wilkinson et al., supra note 1, at 4.
41
Sarah Miller, Internal Displacement: An Agenda for Progress,
Refugees Int’l (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/8/6/internal-displacement-an-agenda-for-progress#.
42
Displaced People: Why Are More Fleeing Home than Ever
Before?, BBC (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-49638793.
37
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asylum or other types of international protection,
such as temporary aid that may be more readily available across borders.43
Since the 1951 Convention bases its classifications on
a displaced person’s geographic location, it prioritizes mobility over need.44 Under this framework, the
UNHCR and states give priority to migrants that have
been willing and able to arrive in a signatory state
over migrants that have found temporary shelter in
camps, non-signatory states, or their own countries
of origin.45 Migrants who are less mobile or those that
only have the resources to journey to a camp instead
of a port of entry are no less deserving of legal and
physical protection than others seeking safety.46 The
nature of movement caused by slow-onset environmental changes also tends to be gradual as climate
conditions deteriorate over time, rather than the
“flight” often seen with conventional refugees.47
Critics are also concerned that amending the 1951
Convention would be a wasted effort.48 First, the nexus dynamics, or the adverse effects of climate change
in the refugee context would be very difficult to reflect
in a treaty.49 The overlapping and entangled drivers of
migration complicate a convention’s ability to isolate
grounds for classifying a person as a refugee.50 Broader definitions may even have the ill effect of actually
excluding the very class of persons that a convention
originally intended to protect. By allowing more people to request refugee status, more time and resources
must be devoted to the determination of status

Id.
Millbank, supra note 33, at 14.
45
See id.
46
See id. (describing the difficulty experienced by women
migrating with children and their exposure and vulnerability
to human rights abuses in refugee camps).
47
Jane McAdam, Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate
Change Displacement Treaty Is Not the Answer, 23 Int’l J.
Refugee L. 2, 8 (2011).
48
Id. at 17 (explaining that ratification, implementation, and
enforcement would be difficult to compel).
49
McAdam, supra note 34.
50
Millbank, supra note 33, at 15.
43
44
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procedures, which could possibly restrict or delay
access for those fleeing conflict or violence.51 A related
concern is that the process may be subject to a greater
number of abusive claims, so states parties may be
more inclined to restrict access to status procedures.
In turn, this may block displaced persons who would
qualify for refugee status under the current legal
framework from achieving that status and gaining the
protection that they deserve under a convention.52
Another obstacle to amending the Convention is the
general lack of public empathy and understanding
of refugees and asylees, especially with nationalist
sentiments on the rise recently worldwide.53 Without sufficient media attention and public empathy to
drive political agendas, it is unlikely that a significant
number of states would be interested in spending the
time on negotiations and willing to become signatories to an updated convention.54 There are already
148 signatories to the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol,55 yet there is not enough state participation
to accept all the refugees that fall under the current
convention. States parties to international or regional
agreements claim to be either at capacity for

Id. at 10.
Id. at 10, 18.
53
Id. at 2, 15 (explaining that because states approach asylum
as an issue of immigration control and domestic politics, the
public tends to believe that most asylum seekers arriving in
western countries are motivated by economic and social reasons rather than the more “obvious” images of refugees driven
from destroyed homes, which elicits more cynicism and hostility towards expanded immigration rather than sympathy);
McAdam, supra note 34.
54
Millbank, supra note 33, at ii, 15 (alluding to the public
becoming suspicious of asylum seekers’ motives when lacking
sympathy-provoking media coverage of refugees instead of
supportive).
55
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, States Parties to the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol 1 (Apr. 2015), https://www.unhcr.
org/en-us/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/States-parties-1951convention-its-1967-protocol.html.
51
52
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accepting refugees or unwilling to comply with their
obligations.56 Directing the 1951 Convention towards
even more displaced persons, even if on distinct
grounds
of climate or disaster displacement, is unlikely to
facilitate the protection of environmental migrants.
Already, there are more people that qualify as refugees
than can or will be helped by states parties to existing
migration agreements.57 A more appropriate and encompassing response to expanding aid for displaced
persons will look away from the legal definitions of
the term refugee and towards environmental adaptation and measures relating to disaster prevention,
preparedness, and response.
IV. The UN’s Role in Protection of Environmentally Displaced Persons
There is no singular UN agency responsible for
managing climate or disaster-induced internal displacements. However, in 1991 the UN emphasized
the importance of providing humanitarian assistance
to victims of natural disasters, both in terms of immediate recovery and sustainable development,58 in
addition to promoting prevention and preparedness
efforts.59 Resolution 46/182 resulted in specific endeavors to advocate for inter-agency coordination of
humanitarian responses, such as the creation of the
Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).60
Seyla Benhabib, The End of the 1951 Refugee Convention?
Dilemmas of Sovereignty, Territoriality, and Human Rights,
2 Jus Cogens 75, 95 (2020) (explaining that international
human rights law recognizes state sovereignty, providing a
loophole that excuses non-cooperation and non-compliance).
57
Trends at a Glance: Forced Displacement in 2018, U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees 2 (June 20, 2019), https://www.unhcr.
org/5d08d7ee7.pdf (statistics demonstrating that 70.8 million
persons were forcibly displaced at the end of 2018, yet only
25.9 million had been granted refugee status and 3.5 million
were awaiting decisions on their asylum applications).
58
G.A. Res. 46/182, ¶¶ 1, 9 (Dec. 19, 1991).
59
Id. ¶ 8.
60
Resolution 46/182, Which Created the Humanitarian System,
Turns 25, OCHA (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.unocha.org/
story/resolution-46182-which-created-humanitarian-system-turns-twenty-five.
56
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After some structural reform in the 1990s, the UN
designated the Emergency Relief Coordinator as the
centralized leader with regard to internal displacement.61 The Coordinator has prioritized strengthening assistance and protections for disaster victims and
for internally displaced persons, encompassing the
environmentally displaced persons that remain within their home countries.62 One year later, the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement were endorsed
by the UN Commission on Human Rights.63 While
not legally binding, the Guiding Principles have
become well-recognized by heads of states as an
authoritative framework for the protection of internally displaced persons,64 including those “forced or
obliged to flee their homes . . . as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of . . . natural or human-made
disasters.”65
Although it does not recognize climate migrants as
refugees,66 the UNHCR has been asked by the UN
General Assembly to take a pioneering role in addressing disaster-related displacement.67 In 2007,
the then-High Commissioner for Refugees, António
Guterres, urged states to address forced migration
caused by environmental degradation and climate
change.68 He stressed that the UNHCR has a duty to
alert states of issues that hamper progressive developG.A. Res. 70/165, ¶ 27 (Dec. 17, 2015).
G.A. Res. 55/82, ¶ 109 (May 30, 2000).
63
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N.
Off. Coordination Humanitarian Aff. 1 ¶¶ 1–2 (1998).
64
G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 132 (Oct. 24, 2005) (as recognized by the
heads of state in attendance at the 2005 World Summit in New
York).
65
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra
note 63, at 1.
66
José Riera, Senior Advisor to the Dir. of Int’l Prot., U.N.
High Comm’r for Refugees, Int’l Conf. on “Millions of People
without Protection: Climate Change Induced Displacement
in Developing Countries”: Challenges Relating to Climate
Change Induced Displacement 4 (Berlin, Jan. 29, 2013).
67
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, U.N.
High Comm’r for Refugees, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants.html (last
visited May 1, 2022).
68
António Guterres, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Statement to the Third Comm. of the United Nations Gen. Assembly, 62nd Session (New York, Nov. 8, 2007).
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ment, along with the responsibility to find solutions
to such challenges.69 The High Commissioner for
Refugees created an internal task force on climate
change, which monitors fluctuations in climate-induced migration and offers input to the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC) task force on climate
change.70 Through its involvement and leadership in
the IASC sub-group on migration and displacement,
the UNHCR developed a humanitarian advocacy
strategy and began to submit joint policy papers to
the annual United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of the
Parties.71
The UN General Assembly adopted the New York
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (New York
Declaration) in 2016, providing member states the
opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to protecting migrants and refugees.72 The New York Declaration acknowledges climate change, natural disasters,
and other environmental factors as drivers of migration.73 Member states committed to addressing all
drivers that create or exacerbate large movements
of people.74 Accordingly, they also pledged to combat environmental degradation and ensure effective
responses to natural disasters and the adverse impacts
of climate change.75 Lastly, member states agreed to
assist migrants experiencing natural disasters on a
needs-basis in coordination with the relevant national
authorities.76 The New York Declaration “mark[ed] a
political commitment of unprecedented force and

Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 20, at 15.
Id. at 15.
71
Id.
72
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, U.N.
High Comm’r for Refugees, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants.html (last
visited May 1, 2022).
73
G.A. Res. 71/1, ¶ 1 (Sept. 19, 2016).
74
Id. ¶ 43.
75
Id.
76
Id. ¶ 50.
69
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resonance,”77 paving the way for future covenants that
focus on environment-induced migrants.78
Building upon the New York Declaration is the 2018
Global Compact on Refugees, which recognizes that
“climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee
movements.”79 The UN appreciates the gravity of the
effect that climate change and natural disasters have
on forcibly displaced persons that qualify for refugee
status.80 Therefore, the UNHCR’s work protecting
and supporting refugees also extends to persons both
internally and externally displaced by disasters and
climate change. The UNHCR offers direct assistance
by providing legal advice, guidance, and development
of norms to enhance the protection of rights for displaced persons.81 The UNHCR also conducts research
and promotes policy coherence relating to disaster
displacement.82
UNHCR field-based activities are aimed to address
internal and external displacement by ensuring
sustainable responses, promoting risk reduction, and
reducing the environmental impact of refugee settlements.83 The agency plays a leading role in the Global
Protection Cluster, which assists and protects displaced persons affected by natural disasters and conflict.84 When needed, the UNHCR deploys emergency teams to provide services that include registration,
Filippo Grandi (@Refugees), Twitter (Sept. 19,
2016, 9:03 AM), https://twitter.com/Refugees/status/777855627800510464.
78
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, supra note
72.
79
G.A. Res. 73/12, ¶ 8 (Nov. 26, 2018).
80
See UN Human Rights Committee Decision on Climate
Change Is a Wake-up Call, According to UNHCR, U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.unhcr.
org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/1/5e2ab8ae4/un-humanrights-committee-decision-climate-change-wake-up-call-according.html.
81
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 20, at 26.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 27.
84
Id. at 10; Who We Are, Glob. Prot. Cluster, https://www.
globalprotectioncluster.org/about-us/who-we-are/ (last visited
May 1, 2022).
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documentation, family reunification, shelter, hygiene,
and nutrition.85 The UNHCR has also created guidance for planned relocation to provide states with a
preparative alternate to forced displacement.86
The 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (Global Compact) is the first migration policy that identified climate change as a direct
driver of migration.87 The Global Compact encourages multilateral agreements as a means to address
the root causes of climate change along with developing adaptation measures in vulnerable countries to
prevent further forced displacement.88 Although the
Global Compact is not legally binding, it builds upon
a framework of commitments from member states in
the New York Declaration, fostering international cooperation while upholding the sovereignty of states.89
Member states commit to “create conducive . . .
environmental conditions for people to lead peaceful,
productive and sustainable lives in their own country
. . . while ensuring that desperation and deteriorating
environments do not compel them to seek a livelihood elsewhere through irregular migration.”90
The Global Compact, although lacking any enforcement mechanisms, includes many recommendations
to achieve this goal, such as identifying the needs of
victims of slow-onset disasters and corresponding
solutions,91 sharing data and information on migraClimate Change and Disaster Displacement, supra note 3;
What We Do, Glob. Prot. Cluster, https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/about-us/what-we-do/ (last visited May 1,
2022).
86
See Elizabeth Ferris, Guidance on Protecting People from
Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation, Brookings Inst., Geo. Univ. & U.N. High Comm’r for
Refugees (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.unhcr.org/protection/
environment/562f798d9/planned-relocation-guidance-october-2015.html.
87
Carolyn Beeler, UN Compact Recognizes Climate Change
as Driver of Migration for First Time, The World (Dec. 11,
2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-11/
un-compact-recognizes-climate-change-driver-migration-first-time.
88
See G.A. Res. 73/195 (Dec. 19, 2018).
89
G.A. Res. 73/195, ¶ 7 (Dec. 19, 2018).
90
Id. ¶ 18.
91
Id. ¶ 21(h).
85
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tion movements amongst all member states,92 and
developing adaptation and resilience strategies to
combat both sudden and slow-onset disasters and
environmental degradation.93 The Global Compact
also supports minimizing all adverse drivers that
compel people to leave their countries of origin and
investing in programs with sustainable development
goals.94 It is important for states to create and improve
programs that focus on disaster resilience, disaster
risk reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and displacement preparation and response.95
The last step requires monitoring and anticipating
disaster risks and threats that might trigger migration
movements, strengthening early warning systems,
developing emergency procedures, and supporting
post-emergency recovery.96
V. The Nansen Initiative and the Agenda’s
Role in Promoting Protection of Environmentally Displaced Persons
International organizations besides the UN have taken action to facilitate cooperation amongst states to
expand protections for climate and disaster-displaced
persons. The Nansen Initiative is a state-led process
aimed at building consensus on methods to address
protecting and assisting externally displaced persons
in the context of disasters and climate change.97 While
the the Nansen Initiative is originally based on a bilateral agreement between Switzerland and Norway, it
encourages other interested states to get involved and
develop effective practices on a nonbinding basis.98 In
2015, the Nansen Initiative produced and endorsed
Id. ¶ 18(h).
Id. ¶ 18(i).
94
G.A. Res. 73/195, ¶ 18(b) (Dec. 19, 2018) (These programs
would attempt to empower countries of origin to address:
poverty, food security, health and sanitation, education,
inclusive economic growth, employment, gender equality,
infrastructure, urban and rural development, violence, discrimination, good governance, human rights, resilience and
disaster risk reduction, and climate change mitigation and
adaptation.).
95
Id. ¶ 18(b)–(c).
96
Id. ¶ 18(c).
97
The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, at 6.
98
Id.
92
93

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 13

140

Special Symposium Article

an Agenda with guidelines for protecting displaced
persons, reducing disaster risk, building resiliency,
and preparing relocation plans and disaster responses.99 The Agenda calls for solidarity and cooperation amongst states, regional organizations, and the
international community, because potentially any and
every state may encounter disaster displacement as a
country of origin, transit, or destination.100
To protect displaced persons, member states must
take measures to both prevent and respond to disaster displacement and its causes. For prevention
and preparation, the Agenda recommends mapping
historical cross-border displacement movements to
identify communities at risk of future displacement,
amending existing policies to include procedures for
identifying and admitting disaster-displaced persons,
and increasing the capacity of border and immigration authorities to implement such amended policies.101 For response, the Agenda outlines effective
practices that receiving states can follow.102 At the very
least, destination states should consider granting entry and temporary stay to disaster-displaced persons,
as well as streamlining the visa and refugee processing system.103 These steps, in addition to suspending
documentation requirements, would expedite migration processing of displaced person and facilitate
cross-border movement for pastoralists and livestock
through transhumance agreements, especially in
times of drought.104
The Nansen Initiative Agenda also recommends that
receiving states ensure displaced persons enjoy full
human rights, have access to assistance to meet basic
needs, and receive personal documentation indicating their status and right to stay.105 During this time
of stay, destination states should consider providing
humanitarian protection measures for climate-displaced persons. Measures such as suspending deporId. at 7.
100
Id. at 6.
101
Id. ¶ 43.
102
Id. ¶ 47.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. ¶ 61.
99
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tation and extending or changing migration statuses
would prevent displaced persons from being returned
to extreme hardship or a state of disaster that cannot
support returning citizens.106 These measures can also
apply to foreigners who were already abroad when a
disaster-affected their country of origin.107 Granting
protection from return to a state of disaster shields the
individual migrant, but the Agenda also encourages
states to allow those migrants to remain in order to
send remittances to support family members in the
disaster-affected country of origin as a measure of solidarity.108 Regulation of admission of foreigners is an
inherent right of all states, and the Nansen Initative
is careful to recognize states’ sovereignty and broad
discretion when it provides guidelines for migration
in the context of environmental drivers.109
VI. Planned Relocation to Shift Irregular,
Unprotected Migration to Strategic, Protected Migration
Focusing efforts on preventing and managing irregular migration rather than on subsequent, reactive
protections may reduce unplanned and unprotected
displacements. Instead of viewing migration as a
failure to stay in place and adapt, it should be regarded as a proactive adaptation strategy, especially
in the early stages of environmental degradation.110
Providing migrants with safer, planned pathways for
reducing reliance on the changing environment and
moving out of harm’s way is a strategic management
solution that allows individuals and governments
the ability to respond to gradual climate change in a
dignified, informed, and controlled manner.

Id. ¶ 65.
Id. ¶ 66.
108
Id. ¶¶ 67–68.
109
Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
110
See Int’l Org. for Migration, Migration, Climate
Change and the Environment 2 (May 2009), https://www.
iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/IDM/iom_policybrief_may09_en.pdf.
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States should allow some flexibility on a case-specific
basis when displaced persons are prepared to return
to their country or region of origin.111 With the goal of
sustainable reintegration to avoid recurrent displacement if a community has deteriorated to the point of
uninhabitability, displaced persons may consider
returning to their country and resettling in a different
location.112 Deterioration at this level may include
significant destruction of residences, businesses, and
infrastructure, land infertility, and risk of exposure
to recurrent disasters.113 By assisting climate-induced
migrants to return to a new residence within their
countries of origin, receiving states will shift their
responsibility back to the countries of origin. If this
is not practical, then receiving states should facilitate
long-term or permanent authorization to stay.114
As suggested by the Nansen Initiative Agenda, bilateral or regional agreements on regular migration may
be the most effective facilitators of a planned relocation.115 Arrangements to support climate-induced
migrants may be based on any number of grounds
depending on states’ or regions’ needs, but most
frequently they are created to support labor, family
unification, or humanitarian assistance.116 Migration
agreements for seasonal work can assuage displacements caused by cyclical natural disasters, such as
hurricanes, tsunamis, tornados, flooding, and wildfires.117 Pastoralists118 regularly migrate to accommodate their animals’ dietary needs, but environmental
stress that reduces the quality or quantity of grass

See The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, ¶ 72.
Id. ¶ 72.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. ¶ 88.
116
Movement Assistance, Int’l Org. for Migration, https://
www.iom.int/movement-assistance (last visited May 1, 2022).
117
The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, ¶ 88; Ionesco,
supra note 56.
118
Pastoralists, Lumen, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/
culturalanthropology/chapter/pastoralists/ (last visited May 1,
2022) (defining “pastoralists” as those enagaged in a subsistence strategy dependent on the herding of animals and characterized by a nomadic lifestyle and extensive land use, i.e.,
moving to temporary pastures seasonally or as needed).
111
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and potable water force pastoralists to use increased
or varied migration to cope.119 Permitting pastoral
migration across state borders helps herders maintain
their way of life and adjust migration routes according to environmental changes.120
Expanded bilateral or regional labor agreements may
be another method to assist individuals in at-risk
communities plan for relocation. Labor agreements,
while subject to the parties’ discretion, often provide
new skills, education, or jobs to migrants, thereby
producing employment opportunities in safer locations and the opportunity to send remittances to
vulnerable communities of origin.121 Individual participants that take advantage of labor agreements will
have more reliable migration pathways if permanent
relocation is ever required due to substantial climate
change causing inhabitability.122 These pathways can
be especially important for small island states, arctic communities, and other countries experiencing
significant loss of territory from climate change.123 Facilitating migration may also ease population pressure
on fragile regions suffering substantial environmental
degradation.124
When negotiating agreements, states must be aware
of the risk of exploitation of migrants and should
therefore promote and enforce human rights.125
Host states may also be wary of migrants themselves
exploiting agreements and taking advantage of state
resources, but it is important to consider that longterm and permanent relocation is often a last resort
for many people.126 Because of cultural ties, identity,
and connection to the land, many people do not

112

The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, ¶ 87.
Id. ¶ 88.
121
Id. ¶ 89.
122
Id. ¶ 90.
123
Id.; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate 384
(Hans-Otto Pörtner et al. eds., 2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/
site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2019/12/SROCC_FullReport_FINAL.pdf.
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consider relocation to be an appropriate option unless absolutely necessary for survival.127 Several small
Pacific Island nations are now seriously considering
regional migration plans involving permanent relocation as their “only reasonable and sustainable option,”
according to Dr. Melchior Mataki, who serves as the
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VII. Adaptation Efforts to Support
Environmentally Vulnerable Communities
Avoid Displacement

If planned relocation is not the most feasible solution
to the deterioration of the natural environment, implementing adaptation measures can improve a comSolomon Islands’ Secretary of the Ministry of Envimunity’s quality of life, economic stability, and safety
of individuals. Investing in more resilient infrastrucronment and Chair of the National Disaster Coun128
cil. Many islands are experiencing severe erosion,
ture and housing can reduce human displacements
relentless flooding, and salinization of farmland from and the cost of rebuilding after a natural disaster
rising sea levels.129 Ocean temperatures are rising, ma- strikes or as poor climate conditions progress.133 Natrine life and coral reefs are fading, terrestrial wildlife
ural hazards, in addition to weak infrastructure, can
is seeking higher elevation, and droughts and natural prevent residents from accessing healthcare, employdisasters are becoming more severe.130 Despite all the ment, and education.134 In low and middle-income
adverse effects of climate change, many native Pacific countries, natural hazard disruptions can result in
Islanders are reluctant to leave their homes permayearly losses of $390 billion or more.135 Examples of
nently, 131 knowing that as they leave, it is unlikely
adaptive infrastructure include earthquake-resistant
anyone will ever return and some of the islands may
buildings and sea walls, dams, and dikes to reduce the
132
no longer exist above sea level within a few decades.
destruction caused by flooding, landslides, and glacial
melts.136 Communities can invest in natural terrestrial
defenses as well by planting vegetation along coastlines to prevent erosion, flooding, and salinization of
soil and freshwater sources.137 This can be an espe127
The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, ¶ 94.
cially useful method when there is limited or unstable
128
Ashley Westerman, ‘We Need Support’: Pacific Islands Seek
ground for building upon.138
Help and Unity to Fight Climate Change, NPR (Oct. 5, 2019,
11:56 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/05/764570478/
we-need-support-pacific-islands-seek-help-and-unity-to-fightclimate-change.
129
John Campbell & Olivia Warrick, Climate Change and
Migration Issues in the Pacific, Econ. & Social Comm’n for
Asia & the Pac. 2 (Aug. 2014), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/
migpractice/docs/261/Pacific.pdf.
130
Id. at 6–7, 15–16, 18.
131
Id. at 10, 21, 24 (explaining the importance of Pacific
Islanders’ connection with their homeland for purposes of
community, traditions, and identity).
132
Legal Implications of Sea Level Rise for Small Island States
Explored in New World Bank Study, World Bank (Oct.
6, 2021), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/10/05/legal-implications-of-sea-level-rise-forsmall-island-States-explored-in-new-world-bank-study (explaining that loss of land due to sea level rise is a clear threat
to the very existence of Pacific States and puts entire islands at
risk of becoming unhabitable); Adapting to Rising Sea Levels
in Marshall Islands, World Bank (Oct. 22, 2021), https://
storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/8c715dcc5781421ebff46f35ef34a04d (explaining that the Marshall Islands will be one
of the first nations to experience sea level rise as a genuine
existential threat without mitigating measures).

Additional adaptation measures include spatial adjustments, like relocating vulnerable buildings and
infrastructure further inland to protect from rising
sea levels, erosion, or frequent coastal disasters.139
Further measures may include modifying agricultural
practices, planting more resilient crops, and finding
alternate livelihoods.140 For an example, coastal residents that rely heavily on fishing practices for income
The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, ¶ 78.
3 Things You Need to Know About Adaptation and Resilience, World Bank (June 1, 2020), https://www.worldbank.
org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/3-things-you-need-toknow-about-adaptation-and-resilience.
135
Id.
136
The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, ¶ 78.
137
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra
note 123, at 383.
138
Id. at 384.
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Id. at 384–85.
140
The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, ¶ 78.
133
134

Erickson: Filling the Protection Gaps for Climate Change and Disaster-Induc

Vol. 25

Issue 2

may need to shift to a more sustainable occupation
when rising sea temperatures or salinization have
caused the ecosystem to become prohibitive for the
preferred aquatic catch.141 Local communities may
also need to alter their diet when nutrition sources,
whether flora or fauna, become scarce or completely
unavailable.142 Adaptation measures of any kind not
only bolster the community that is directly affected
by a disaster or climate change, but in the event that
displacements do occur despite these measures, other
communities are more resilient and prepared to host
displaced persons.143
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objectives at its highest level of ambition to effectuate
worldwide change.148 Suggestions for advancement include national adaptation plans, updated periodically,
comprised of individual state needs, priorities, plans,
and actions.149

An essential tool in pursuing resiliency and creating
migration agreements is space for regional, bilateral,
and international dialogue.150 Forum members generally emphasize sustainability, resiliency, and elevation
of migrants’ voices.151 International and regional organizations for migration and conservation have developed several such dialogue forums in the past two
A major cooperative adaption effort that resulted
decades, such as the International Dialogue on Migrafrom the twenty-first session of the Conference of the tion,152 the Global Island Partnership,153 the Pacific
Parties (COP21) to the UN Framework Convention
Islands Forum,154 the regional Migration Dialogues
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the Paris Agreefor Africa,155 the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration
ment. Ratified by 189 states,144 the Agreement seeks to and Development,156 the Asia Dialogue on Forced Miguide a global response to the threat of climate change gration,157 the Central America—North America
and reduce climate-induced displacements by encouraging mitigation and adaptation strategies.145 The
148
central goal is to limit the planet’s rise in temperature 149 Id. at art. 4, ¶ 3.
Id. at art. 7, ¶¶ 9–11.
during the twenty-first century by reducing green150
G.A. Res. 73/195, ¶ 19 (Dec. 19, 2018); The Nansen Inihouse gas emissions, but it also urges states parties
tiative,
supra note 29, at ¶ 125.
to increase resiliency to climate change.146 Parties to
151
E.g., Int’l Org. for Migration, International Dialogue on
the Agreement must report their achievements every
Migration 14, 40, 51–53 (2012), https://publications.iom.int/
five years with transparency and accuracy, and each
system/files/pdf/rb18_eng_web.pdf.
152
communication is expected to reflect progress beyond
Int’l Org. for Migration, International Dialogue on
the previous one.147 The Paris Agreement encourages Migration (2012), https://publications.iom.int/system/files/
pdf/rb18_eng_web.pdf.
each country to contribute to these global
GLISPA 2030 Strategy, Glob. Island P’ship (2020),
http://www.glispa.org/images/GLISPA-2030-Strategy-Short.
pdf; About Our Global Island Partnership, Glob. Island
P’ship, http://www.glispa.org/about (last visited May 1, 2022).
154
G.A. Res. 73/332 (Aug. 1, 2019).
155
Int’l Org. for Migration, Migration Dialogue for Central
African States (2020), https://www.iom.int/migration-dialogue-central-african-States-midcas; Int’l Org. for Migration, Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (2020), https://
www.iom.int/migration-dialogue-southern-africa-midsa;
Int’l Org. for Migration, Migration Dialogue for West Africa (2020), https://www.iom.int/midwa.
156
Int’l Org. for Migration, Euro-African Dialogue on
Migration and Development (Rabat Process) 2020, https://
www.iom.int/euro-african-dialogue-migration-and-development-rabat-process#:~:text=The%20Euro%2DAfrican%20
Dialogue%20on,States%20(ECOWAS)%2C%20to%20tackle.
157
Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration, Ctr. for Pol’y Dev.,
https://cpd.org.au/intergenerational-wellbeing/asia-dialogue-on-forced-migration/ (last visited May 1, 2022).
153

See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
supra note 123, at 26.
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Id. at 259.
143
The Nansen Initiative, supra note 29, ¶ 80.
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UNFCCC, Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification,
https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification (last visited May 1, 2022).
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See Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No.
16-1104, art. 2 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]; Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC – Paris COP-21,
Advisory Grp. on Climate Change & Hum. Mobility 3
(Nov. 2015), https://www.unhcr.org/uk/565b21bd9.pdf.
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Migration Dialogue,158 and specific programs within
the Inter-American Dialogue.159 The European Union
(EU) has also structured a variety of bi-regional dialogues concerning migration and development.160
VIII. Preparation and Response Efforts to
Improve Resiliency of Environmentally
Vulnerable Communities
In addition to environmental adaptation and planned
migration options, vulnerable communities can
benefit significantly from disaster preparation and
improved response tactics, leading to risk reduction
in the future.161 Monitoring environmental changes,
such as rainfall, soil saturation, sea levels, wind patterns, geothermic activity, and frequency and severity
of natural disasters, helps communities to anticipate
future destruction and hardships.162 In turn, this assists with disaster preparation, such as reinforcement
of infrastructure and storage of survival resources, as
well as disaster response plans that often include early
warning signals, shelter-in-place instructions,

Central America – North America Migration Dialogue, CIESAS Occidente, http://www.canamid.org/en/site/canamid
(last visited May 1, 2022).
159
Migration, Remittances & Development, Inter-American
Dialogue, https://www.thedialogue.org/programs/programs/remittances/ (last visited May 1, 2022); Energy, Climate
Change & Extractive Industries, Inter-American Dialogue,
https://www.thedialogue.org/programs/programs/energy/
(last visited May 1, 2022).
160
Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility, and Employment (MME), Int’l Org. for Migration, https://www.iom.
int/africa-eu-partnership-migration-mobility-and-employment-mme (last visited May 1, 2022); EU – CELAC Structured
and Comprehensive Bi-regional Dialogue on Migration, Int’l
Org. for Migration, https://www.iom.int/eu-celac-structured-and-comprehensive-bi-regional-dialogue-migration
(last visited May 1, 2022).
161
Preparedness for Climate Change, Int’l Fed’n of Red
Cross & Red Crescent Soc’y, 9–10 (Jan. 10, 2003), https://
www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/climatechange_report_final_eng.pdf.
162
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to
Advance Climate Change Adaptation 17 (Christopher B.
Field et al. eds., 2012), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SREX_Full_Report-1.pdf.
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evacution routes, identification and location of victims, and administration of aid.163
While disaster preparation is vital for all regions
around the world, it is especially crucial for less developed countries where there is a high potential for a
natural hazard to develop into a disaster and result in
mass displacement.164 Low or uneven concentrations
of development tend to contribute to heightened vulnerability in the context of natural disasters because
economically unstable communities are the most
likely to experience destruction and displacement.165
In addition, they are less likely to have the resources
or governance to disburse benefits to aid regrowth,
or even survival, for affected persons and businesses.
Communities that are unable to implement preparation strategies through reinforcing infrastructure and
stockpiling emergency supplies remain susceptible
to environmental hazards and will continue to lack
the resiliency necessary to bolster themselves against
disasters.
Building policies to ensure rapid and effective responses to natural disasters can alleviate many displacements.166 Access to sufficient shelter, food, clean
water, and other survival resources is key to providing
the means for residents to maintain their physical
presence in or near their communities or home
countries.167 Even with slow-onset climate changes, if
living conditions deteriorate towards an unbearable
level, individuals will often turn to migration as a
solution to avoid the oncoming crisis.168 Improving
local and national resiliency and reducing reliance on
migration are the most effective methods to curb displacements. Response policies can also be strengthened by transboundary cooperation among countries
that share ecosystems, such as along coastlines, fault
lines, and river banks.169
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Providing specific protections for IDPs in response
to a disaster not supports not only individuals but
also whole communities.170 Internal assistance for
displaced persons dissuades those individuals from
seeking support and opportunities across borders and
consequently converting to external displacements.171
Preserving and protecting those who are internally
displaced equips countries with the human
resources to aid and speed their own rehabilitation
efforts. Some effective ways to support these kinds
of post-disaster reestablishment efforts is to develop
incentivizing and sustainable methods for internal
protections.172 Such methods may include voluntary
return and reintegration at or nearby the place of
origin, integration in places of refuge, or resettlement
elsewhere within the country.173 These solutions apply
both to displaced persons that have already crossed
borders and those that have remained within their
country of origin.174
Only a small number of states and regions currently
have policies that address responses and protections
relating to internal displacement resulting from
natural disasters.175 Even where such policies have
been adopted, there is sometimes confusion regarding accountability for protecting internally displaced
persons.176 Responsibility can fluctuate amongst state

Id. ¶ 74.
171
See id. ¶ 99.
172
See id. ¶ 101.
173
Id. ¶ 102; Brookings Inst., Inter-Agency Standing
Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for
Internally Displaced Persons 5 (Apr. 2010), https://
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institutions and even between the state, regional,
and international levels.177 Operational discrepancies
aside, sustainable and functional approaches to reintegration, whether taking place in the same locality or
elsewhere, are necessary to fill the protection gap that
many displaced persons experience during the period
between the initial disaster and subsequent reconstruction.178
Preventive measures are another key to reducing the
impact of natural disasters and climate change on
vulnerable and even well-prepared communities. The
Paris Agreement is the most direct, comprehensive
multilateral attempt to implement methods for the
reasonable prevention or reduction of environmental
impacts around the world.179 Decreasing the negative
human-generated contributions to climate change
will prevent unnecessarily advancing environmental destruction of people’s homes and livelihoods.180
Global cooperation will produce the greatest success
and synergy for an efficient agenda to address the
aspects of climate change caused or accelerated by
human activity.181 The most identifiable prevention
tactic at this time is the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions.182 By curbing emissions, the Agreement
aims to prevent the global average temperature from
rising more than two degrees Celsius, with the intended impact of reducing the risk and impacts of
climate change.183
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Conclusion
Since the existing barriers to increasing the legal
protections for climate-induced migrants persist, focusing on a legal redefinition of refugees is unlikely to
help those environmentally displaced persons most at
risk. Many of these individuals will remain internally
displaced and unable to access international protection since climate change often has slow-onset effects
that do not necessarily force migration. Grounds for
refugee status under a new definition would also be
difficult to isolate from one another, complicating the
status determination process. Instead of relying so
heavily on the reactive nature of the 1951 Convention, worldwide attention should turn towards proactive measures to develop protected and dignified
paths for migration.
Providing alternative methods of preemptive protection is likely to better serve at-risk communities by
strengthening disaster preparedness and improving
resiliency. Adaptation efforts, disaster response plans,
and strategic relocation are more easily tailored to
individual communities and their environmental
threats than one universal definition for legal status
that only offers post-crisis protection for external displacements. Key features of success in these types of
programs consider migrants’ rights to dignity, safety,
and active participation. Natural disasters and climate
change causing irregular, unprotected migration can
be reduced when states take steps like these to close
the gap between humanitarian action and development action.
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